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Professor Dorsey was a first-term student at Yale Law School during the
spring of 1946. Concurrently, F.S. C. Northrop's The Meeting of East and
West was first published. This book's tremendous impact reached far be-
yond the field ofphilosophy of culture. Profiled in "The New Yorker" and
quoted by "Life,'" Professor Northrop was invited to speak across the
United States and abroad. Northrop's book made the definitive case for
the influence of culture upon society and law. The Meeting of East and
West demonstrated some of the radical differences in the world's cultures.
Accordingly, Northrop argues, attempts to achieve international peace and
justice must reckon with cultural differences. Professor Dorsey was utterly
convinced, visited with Professor Northrop, and promptly enrolled in
Northrop's course in the Philosophy of Culture in Yale's Silliman College.
Professor Dorsey, however, was troubled by one aspect of Northrop's
thought-what Edel and Flower refer to as his "epistemological determin-
ism. " To Professor Dorsey, Professor Northrop's account of how cultural
premises influence social and legal norms seemed too rationalistic. Ac-
cordingly, when Professor Dorseyjoined the faculty at Washington Univer-
sity School of Law, he developed the courses described in the Introduction.
"Jurisprudence," which examines sets of ideas about justice, did not ade-
quately describe courses or analytical methods concerned with belefs.
Consequently, Professor Dorsey coined and adopted the term
"Jurisculture. "
Frank Fowle is one of Professor Dorsey's students whose thoughts and
reactions contributed to the development of Jurisculture 1, Jurisculture I1,
and their method. Because of his intense interest in the heroic traditions
that sustain cultures, societies, and civilizations, the implications of Juris-
culture for Fowle are more extensive and personal than those of Professor
Dorsey's other students.
JUST DECISIONS*
FRANK F. FOWLE, III**
Dear Reader in the year 2074:
In the academic year 1987-88, retiring Professor Gray L. Dorsey was
* Copyright 1987 by Frank F. Fowle, III
** J.D., Washington University School of Law, 1979.
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honored by his employer, Washington University Law School in St.
Louis, Missouri, United States of America. Professor Dorsey had spent
the greater part of his academic career working out an original theory,
which he styled "Jurisculture". The Law School honored him for this
work by sponsoring a "Festschrift" in which scholars across the world in
Jurisprudence and International Law commented on the meaning and
implications of this useful theory.
I have been selected to contribute as a former student who has been
influenced by the teaching and writing of Professor Dorsey.
I have decided to address the readers in the year 2074 because it will
be 86 years from the publishing of this "Festschrift". Why 86 years?
That is how long it took for John Locke's ideas on natural rights in Con-
cerning Civil Government, to be used by the founding fathers of the
United States of America, practical men of affairs, who justified their
creation of a new nation in The Declaration of Independence. The great-
est honor that a scholar can ever receive is to witness his ideas benefitting
society. Imagine how pleased and honored John Locke would have felt
to witness his words-eighty-six years later-inspiring Americans to a
point where the ideas in The Declaration of Independence were so widely
shared, believed and accepted that they were held to be the "common
sense" of the matter.
In a moment I would like to take one idea-equal decisional compe-
tence-from the corpus of Professor Dorsey's "Jurisculture" and offer it
to the generation in being in 2074 as something that could be widely
shared and appealed to by people professing the democratic faith to build
a more just society.
But first let me share with you how at least one student, myself, was
influenced by the teaching and writing of Professor Dorsey. Why is this
useful? For the simple reason that his ideas helped me considerably in
determining all my actions towards the ideal of justice. Thus, in sharing
with you how this occurred, it will pay him due honor because deeds are
the real test of knowledge, not written exams.
I. FOUR INFLUENCES
Professor Dorsey and his Jurisculture theory have influenced my life in
four major ways: first, his jurisculture course inspired me in part to be-
come a bard; second, it was a major catalyst that inspired me to unify all
my performances around that idea of justice; third, he helped me develop
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a script and obtain a booking for my premiere performance of The Decla-
ration of Independence; fourth, his book, American Freedoms, continues
to exert an influence on me as one of the finest fruits of his Jurisculture
theory. And his idea of equal decisional competence originates in this
little big book.
A. The first influence: I am a bard. I tell of the deeds of heroes. The
genesis of my becoming a bard occurred during the second semester of
Professor Dorsey's Jurisculture course. In it we devoted ourselves "to a
study of law and justice in periods of social change incident to industrial-
ization." We studied Samuel Taylor Coleridge and several other autl~ors
of British Empirical Jurisprudence. For some reason I suspected that
Coleridge might have expressed his jurisprudential ideas in a clearer and
more compressed form in his poetry. So I went to the public library,
obtained a recording of Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner"
by the famous 20th century actor, Richard Burton. I was so transformed
and compelled by Burton's performance that I spent the next several
weeks learning the entire poem by heart. This was not an assignment. I
was determined to this action by myself alone. That summer I per-
formed "The Mariner" for family and friends. And in my final year in
Law School I persuaded the administration to let me take an elementary
course in acting for credit on the theory that it would help me in the
courtroom. That same fall (1978) I started to perform for pay. After
graduating from Law School, I practiced law for about a year; but in
1980 I left the practice of law to become a bard full time. Since then
dramatic performances of classics' has become my livelihood. Such was
the juriscultural genesis of my barding career.
B. The second influence was the role his jurisculture course played in
my movement to the concept of justice as a unifying ideal for my work.
In the first four weeks of the second semester of that course we studied
the contribution that four different sets of jurisprudential ideas had on
changing a society's views as to what constitutes justice. The four ideas
are: American Social Action, German Historicism, Soviet Revolutionary
Historicism as well as British Empiricism. We were then assigned a sem-
inar paper. Because this exercise was designed to train the student in the
use of the Juriscultural technique, it is useful to cite the precise words of
the assignment in the spring of 1978:
1. THE ILIAD OF HOMER, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO; Pericles' Prizes of Valor Speech (also
known as "The Funeral Oration"); The Declaration of Independence; and the "The Rime of the
Ancient Mariner."
[Vol. 65:652
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Each student will select a recent significant development in philosophy,
political theory, sociology, psychology, biology, ecology or behaviorism and
write a paper analyzing the potential contribution of that development to a
more just distribution of rights, obligations and benefits in a post-industrial
society, and discussing the uses that various interest groups might make bf
the implications of this development to justify their respective claims and
demands.
I state it word for word because you, the reader in 2074 AD, can now see
how, over 20 years, Professor Dorsey was able to use smart, striving stu-
dents to help him test and develop his tool of jurisculture to trace ideas
from description, to implication, to application in the real world. I
would estimate that Professor Dorsey has well over 300 such examples of
juriscultural idea-implication-application exercises. Indeed they would
form an interesting appendix to his work in this area.
The reason this exercise had such an impact on me is because I truly
believe that I discovered something useful as a result. Let me briefly ex-
plain. I synthesized Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind2 and
Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man.3 My synthesis was es-
sentially as follows: Teilhard's thesis was "fuller being is closer union."
This was the main idea of his book, The Phenomen of Man. Man is the
primary producer of what Teilhard calls the "noosphere" which is simi-
lar to Anaxagoras'4 "nous" or pure intelligence. This thought encircles
the earth and use of it allows man to control his destiny. Quite simply
noosphere is power.5 Man transits to closer union by increasing his
knowledge (his connection with pure being). Descartes fits in comforta-
bly and usefully here because his Rules provides a method for extending
knowledge, for discovering fresh truths. Thus by using Descartes'
method as set forth in Rules, man grows in knowledge and being and
thereby moves along the path to closer union.
This is not the place to get into the details of this synthesis of
Descartes and Teilhard. The paper was successful in Professor Dorsey's
course. But in my heart, I knew it was good. This might seem inappro-
priate to relate all this in a "Festschrift," but I think it is important be-
cause, using the method of jurisculture, I had discovered something I
knew was important.
2. DESCARTES, RULES FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE MIND (Haldane and Ross trans. 1901)
[hereinafter, RULES].
3. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN (Wall trans. 1959).
4. Greek natural philosopher circa. 500 B.C.- 428 B.C.
5. BACON, 1 NovuM ORGANUM (1620).
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The next year I carried the process one step further in an independent
research course. This time I was trying to apply my synthesis of
Descartes' Rules and Teilhard's The Phenomen of Man to the study of
law. My focus point was the concept of justice. After all, Professor Dor-
sey's Jurisculture always argued for "a more just society." But the con-
cept of justice, I thought, was important for another, more powerful
reason, namely, that in American society "justice" is the explicit and
legitimate original intent of our duly constituted society. We know this
because the U.S. Constitution says so right at the beginning: "We the
people of the United States in order to... establish justice.., do ordain
and establish this Constitution ... ." So it's right there: legitimate, ex-
plicit and inescapable. Furthermore, by article VI the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. This means that all laws (from common law
made by judges to codified law made by legislatures) must tend to pro-
duce justice. In juriscultural terms, justice is the legitimate or lawful or-
dering ideal of American society. It should be noted that there are
several "official" segments (perhaps I should say interest groups) of the
American society that are bound by oath to regulate their activities so
that they conform to the ordering ideal of justice. I am speaking of all
lawyers admitted to any bar, all judges, all politicians (state and fed-
eral-all the way to the President of the United States) and all members
of the military (officer and enlisted). All of them take an oath, that they
will support (and in the case of the military, defend) the Constitution.
How can they fulfill this oath, this promise unless they know what justice
is? Therefore, they are duty bound to ascertain a working definition of
justice.6 The implication for law schools is that it is legitimate and ap-
propriate to ask of each decision in each branch of the law: Is this a just
result?
It would seem, then, that the question "What is justice" is appropriate.
6. I should note that at this writing, justice is not a fashionable subject in law firms, law
schools and political science departments in universities across the nation. Indeed there is a current
joke at the Harvard Law School that if you want to know what justice is you should go across the
street to the Divinity School. Furthermore, when you talk to these people about the relationship of
law to justice, they are somewhat embarrassed-they either laugh at the question or become visibly
uncomfortable. I would wager that a substantial majority of students produced in today's law
schools have only a vague, inchoate concept of the relationship between law and justice, i.e., that law
is supposed to produce justice. The situation is growing dangerous. I say "dangerous" because
when justice is driven out of a society, it will decline and fall apart. See R.H.C. Davis's discussion of
St. Augustine's argument that the Roman Empire fell because it was not founded on justice in his
book, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE FROM CONSTANTINE TO ST. Louis 38-42 (1952).
[Vol. 65:652
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After all, how will you ever know that you have arrived at a particular
destination unless you know the earmarks of that destination?
The technique of Jurisculture bids us to seek for something that can be
"widely shared." Thus to appeal to a broad base, the idea must be sim-
ple. Indeed the simpler and easier the idea is, the broader will be its
appeal. Descartes concurs with this because it is one of his primary tules
of thought always to start with the clearest, easiest and simplest observa-
tions. Following these principles I reasoned as follows:
What justice is must be extremely obvious. 7 But the answer didn't seem to
leap out at me with extreme self-evidence; so, I looked at the problem from
a different point of view. What is the opposite of justice?
Obviously it is injustice.
The next question is a littler harder: How can you tell that an injustice
occurred? What is the mark, the sign, the indication of an injustice?
The answer is pain, suffering, hurt, harm, damages, injury. In short, I
say injury is the first sign of injustice. The legal concept of "standing" is
illustrative. In order to have a "case" before any judge (or legislative
body for that matter), you must show injury in fact fairly traceable to
(caused by) the acts of the defendant.
Thus, if injury is the first sign of injustice, a condition of no injury
must be the sign of justice. Many people would like to say healing or
repairing the injury is the sign of justice. But wouldn't the parties have
preferred it if no injury had occurred in the first place? Therefore, jus-
tice is a state or condition of no injury. A good word that describes an
injury-free condition is healthy. Thus, I say that justice is health.' For
the sake of discussion, I say that the just society is the healthy injury-free
society.9 Notice that we have arrived at an image of justice that permits
7. Disease is simply injury at the cellular level. N.B., laws regarding controlling the spread of
infectious diseases.
8. Defining the nature of absolute justice has been a task undertaken by the most eminent
political philosophers since the beginning of recorded history, the Bible included. Suffice it to say
that the first book of Plato's REPUBLIC supports the general idea about to be described, that justice is
essentially a healthy, injury-free society.
9. A more complete discussion of this idea of justice will appear in my forthcoming book, THE
IMAGE OF JUSrICE. See also DORSEY, AMERICAN FREEDOMS 15 (1987) [hereinafter, AMERICAN
FREEDOMS] which echoes the idea and the image nicely:
We are all dependent upon the effective functioning of a society. This is so fundamental
that we tend to forget it. The lone human being cannot long survive. By the power of
social organization and action human beings have triumphed over wild animals, have shel-
tered themselves against the elements, have moved with speed and comfort over the face of
the earth, on and under its seas, through and beyond its skies. It takes an effectively func-
tioning society to put food on your plate or a man on the moon, to protect from violence,
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us to escape from the quicksand of abstractions.
Consider this image in Juriscultural terms. It would seem that every
individual person has a natural, constant and uninterrupted desire to live
a life free from injury and disease-in short, a healthy life. This seems
to be so obvious as not even to be worth mentioning. But therein lies its
strength, namely, it is an underlying and extremely widely shared desire,
belief, or ideal. I would go so far as to say that it transcends political (or
national) boundaries, i.e., it is universal.
It would seem reasonable to conclude, therefore, that all officials
tasked with the administration of justice (all lawyers, judges, politicians
and -arguably-the military) must constantly ask themselves whether
the results of their daily decisions (written or unwritten) have produced a
healthier (i.e. more just) society. The immediate consequence of this dis-
covery (that justice is absence of injury) for law schools is that the analy-
sis of all decisions could properly begin with a full description .and
classification of the injury, and then move towards judging who is re-
sponsible for repairing that injury. Now this might result in a whole new
method of legal analysis and study, but so what? It would compel law-
yers to make and interpret laws to produce the injury-free society that
people really want.
I have come to this conclusion by the aid of Jurisculture and
Descartes, both of which diligently seek that which is most absolute.
To sum up influence number two, by developing the implication of my
work in the Jurisculture course I discovered the nature of absolute justice
and its supreme importance as a formative and legitimate ideal. Indeed,
I have since embraced it as the ideal towards which all the selections in
my repertoire are aimed. Let me briefly explain: I am a bard. As a bard
I tell of the deeds of heroes. Any organization-from an individual, to
a family, to a city, to a state, to a nation or society, to a civilization-
that allows coward and hero to be held in equal honor10 will sooner or
later fall apart, a distinctly unhealthy (i.e. unjust) event.
This concept of justice appears to me to be strong and irrefutable. It
inspires me. It is the major influence in my life. And it all began with
Professor Dorsey's Jurisculture course.
or to provide you with a stable and tranquil situation in which to learn, work, create and
enjoy.
10. See Book IX of THE ILIAD OF HOMER. It would be a mistake not to see the contemporary
analogues of coward and hero, namely never-do-well and exceller, in all the fields of endeavor, e.g.,
the professions, sports, arts, sciences, etc.
[Vol. 65:652
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C. The third influence was Professor Dorsey's invaluable assistance
in helping me produce a script for my performance of The Declaration of
Independence and in helping me schedule a premiere performance of it.
Over several months he gave me extremely valuable advice as I evolved
the piece through 5 or 6 successive scripts. His best advice was on the
title. I had settled on "The Soul of the Nation." But he suggested "The
Conscience of the Nation" instead. It was perfect. Few people in the
United States or elsewhere understand what the word soul means. But
the word "conscience" - there is a word that has an extremely wide
recognition factor, which incidentally, gives it juriscultural power be-
cause it is "widely understood."
Furthermore the word "conscience" has a strong moral-imperative
connotation that has the force and effect of suggesting right conduct, i.e.
just conduct or conduct that avoids injuring the interests of others.
Professor Dorsey also helped me obtain my premiere performance of
The Declaration of Independence on March 29, 1985, at a meeting of the
Missouri Bar Advisory Committee on Citizenship Education at the Uni-
versity of Missouri, Columbia.
D. The fourth influence is Professor Dorsey's little book, AMERICAN
FREEDOMS. I had been performing my Declaration of Independence
piece for a short while when Professor Dorsey sent me this short book on
the Bill of Rights. In it he says that to perpetuate and strengthen the
"Democratic Faith," it is proper for public schools "to teach the beliefs
and values that, as a matter of historical fact, are embodied in the Decla-
ration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.""1 The
key phrase for me was and is that beliefs and values were to be treated as
historical facts and that it was right to teach them as facts. 12 Now the
main idea of the Declaration of Independence is that all human beings
are born with the same bundles of natural rights and that government
exists to secure those rights. Injuries occur when those rights are taken
away, disregarded, invaded or otherwise violated. The Declaration com-
plains about 28 such "injuries." Thus the obvious implication is that
good government protects against injuries. The concept of justice out-
lined above clearly underlies The Declaration of Independence as a mat-
11. AMERICAN FREEDOMS, supra note 9, at vi.
12. As has been stated above, "justice" is one of the legitimate ends of our republic as the
Constitution precisely states. Because the idea of justice is normally considered a "value," what we
have here is merger of fact, value and legitimacy. They all coincide in the Constitution. Therefore,
it is quite appropriate to teach "justice" as a legitimate fact-value.
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ter of fact. And, following Juriscultural analysis, the Declaration of
Independence was, as is well know, the "common sense" of the matter.
In other words the value of justice that it contains was widely shared as
an ordering belief of the new nation. What does all this amount to?
This: the values of The Declaration of Independence can be taught as a
fact, and therefore the ideal of justice can be taught as a fact. My dra-
matic performance of The Declaration of Independence brings this value-
fact to life.
Professor Dorsey's book does more than this, however. It contains the
clearest explanation of American fundamental rights that I have ever
read. And as such it is a perfect tool to transmit knowledge of those
rights from one generation to the next. In other words it is a perfect
teaching tool.
But most of all Professor Dorsey sets forth in American Freedoms
what I consider to be the finest fruit of his Jurisculture theory, namely,
"equal decisional competence" as the fundamental ordering belief of the
American democratic faith. He traces it from the Ancient Greeks and
Romans down to the Founding Fathers, in particular, Benjamin Frank-
lin. He says quite plainly:
On the whole, and compared with other actual societies rather than utopias,
American society has moved in the direction of increasingly embodying in
social and governmental institutions the common belief in equal decisional
capacity so that everyone, in fact as well as ideal, will come to have equal
competence to make important decisions.13
Immediately after this quote, Professor Dorsey gives the most beautiful
description of American rights I have ever read. I deliberately refuse to
quote it, because I urge you, the reader in 2074, to seek out the book and
find it yourself. I predict that this little book will eventually become one
of the great classics in the democratic canon. Every time I perform The
Declaration of Independence, I present a copy to my sponsor as a sign of
good will.
Such are the four influences Professor Dorsey and his Jurisculture
have had and continue to have on my life.
II. EQUAL DECISIONAL COMPETENCE
As I understand Jurisculture, the task is to look at a society's constel-
lation of beliefs. Professor Dorsey would call the most widely shared
13. AMERICAN FREEDOMS, supra note 9, at 8.
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belief the ordering belief or idea. In essence he is describing a state-of-
mind. If a group of people is "one-minded" 4 about certain things, they
are very likely to make decisions based on that state of mind.
In the first chapter of American Freedoms, Professor Dorsey states:
"Beliefs that are used to guide the ordering of society and government
are those having to do with the capacity of persons to make important
decisions."" After describing the origins of the American ordering belief
of equal decisional competence of rational, morally responsible persons,
he then goes on to compare it with the Marxist-Leninist ordering belief
of limited decisional competence where the few (the Communist Party
members) "monopolize decision making." 16
The key word, obviously, is "decision." If we look up the word in the
dictionary, we find that it is synonymous with choice. And from
Milton's Areopagitica (1644),17 we learn that "reason is but choosing."
Thus by the transitive property we can safely assert that to decide is to
reason.
Let's carry this a step further. A person is free insofar as he makes
decisions and is determined to action by himself alone. On the other
hand, he is compelled (a slave) when he is determined to act by another in
a fixed and prescribed manner.II Thus the degree of freedom of any or-
ganization (family, city, corporation, state, nation) is easily discerned by
looking at the decision-making apparatus of that organization. This is
precisely what Professor Dorsey's little book does. It bids us ask where
the deciders are in each society, where is the seat of reason.
Although Professor Dorsey talks about "equal decisional capacity," he
certainly doesn't mean that each citizen in the United States has the same
capacity, the same power, of making decisions. Quite obviously people
vary widely in this respect. Indeed, stupid decisions are made daily
throughout the United States, but so are wise ones. What he means, I
believe, is that each of us is held equally accountable for the conse-
14. Another way of saying this is that a society or group or nation "operates by internal consen-
sus" as Japan does. See, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1987, at 19. This article describes how Japan is
likely to "mould its own era" because of its great wealth. The word consensus means unanimity,
which in turn means one mind. This article is a good, though probably unwitting, example of
Jurisculture.
15. AMERICAN FREEDOMS, supra note 9, at 1.
16. Id. at 25.
17. See 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, 394 (1952).
18. SPINOZA, 1 ETHICS, Definition 7 (circa 1664 A.D.). See id. vol. 31 at 355.
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quences of our decisions. Put differently, we each have the equal oppor-
tunity to exercise our reasoning powers to determine our own lives.
So the strength or health (justness) of a society is measured by the
degree to which its people make wise and good decisions. Enter the ra-
tionale for our entire educational system. In every state of the Union the
young from age 6 through 18 (in most cases) are required to be educated.
What compulsory education does, presumably, is to produce reasonable
people. Reasonable people make just choices. That is, choices that keep
the incidence of pain, suffering, hurt, harm, damages-injury to a mini-
mum, or better yet they make choices that genuinely benefit mankind.
The state steps in through laws. The state (courts. and legislatures) is
there as a referee and guarantor of the injury free, healthy society.
In sum then, education is supposed to build good "choosers" (decid-
ers, reasoners). This prepares them to live in the world of market eco-
nomics, which is essentially a world of choice because
markets expand choice, by allowing each individual more partners to deal
with. They [markets] also dissolve personal power. In the check-out
queue, all are equal. Nobody needs to explain or to justify the purchase of a
pound of tomatoes, and if one shopkeeper is surly, there is always another
next door. Competitive pressure ... favors "the survival of the helpful." 19
And the world is moving inexorably toward greater choice. As of this
writing, the two major Marxist-Leninist societies, namely Communist
China and the Soviet Union, are gradually moving away from central
planning (where all important decisions are made by the party) towards a
diffusion of choice, where individual citizens make important life deci-
sions. To be sure, China and the Soviet Union are moving very slowly
and carefully so that the Party doesn't lose control. The slogan for diffu-
sion of decision in the Soviet Union is "glasnost" or openness. The world
is waiting to see how far this will go. In China a similar openness re-
sulted in student uprisings demanding more democracy (in other words,
choice). These uprisings were quickly quelled in 1986, but the market
principles are gradually taking hold in Communist China.20
Two other forces are driving the world toward greater choice. They
are: (1) The explosion in the use of computers along with telecommuni-
cations-i.e. information technology which greatly enhances the power
19. THE ECONOMIsr, September 28, 1987, at 28.
20. "The main point of reform [in Communist China] is to delegate decision-making power
from central planners to factory managers." THE ECONOMIST, August 1, 1987, at 20, China's Eco-
nomic Survey.
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of the individual and (2) the great increasing freedom of capital move-
ments between nation-states.2 All this makes for greater diffusion of
decision making power, away from the few and towards the many.
The winners in such a world are those who are good at the skill of
decision-making. In other words, their decisions are good in that they
bring happiness not misery. After all, if a decision brings sorrow, pre-
sumably we would not have made it. This is why Aristotle defined pru-
dence as making wise decisions relative to happiness.22
A useful implication, then, of Professor Dorsey's American Freedoms
is that the best way to sustain and even improve a society based on the
ideal (or ordering belief) of equal decisional competence is to improve
each individual's capacity to make good decisions. Good decisions obvi-
ously are ones that benefit (do good) all concerned. So throughout the
society decisions are to be cultivated that promote health, well-being and
happiness while at the same time they avoid injuring the property and
personal interests of all other people. In short, the goal is to cultivate
just decisions at the most diffuse level of decision-making. This means
developing what Cicero called "right reason."23
III. THE PROBLEM
A direct result of my reading American Freedoms was to see the pri-
macy of decision-making in a society. It led me to write the following
letter that was published in part in The Economist on June 20, 1987:
In the May 24th issue the article entitled "The Cloud over Gorbachev"
(Chernobyl's lesson for Russia's leaders) stated: "But it is still the party's
high officials who decide .... ." This statement about who makes the deci-
sions in the Soviet Union is a clear indicator of a long term fatal illness of
the Marxist-Leninist methodology. Here is the nature of the illness: From
Lenin to Stalin to Krushchev... all the way down to Gorbachev, the soviet
people have been taught (no, drilled) that the party makes all the decisions.
From Milton's Areopagetica we learned that reason is but choosing. And
since choosing is a nearly perfect synonym (i.e. convertible) for deciding,
the only reasonable conclusion is that since the party has been in charge,
there has been a progressive erosion in the ability to make decisions at all
levels of that sad society. I would wager that when the Chernobyl nuclear
accident happened, the key people at the various levels of the party were
21. THE ECONOMIST, September 26, 1987, at 114.
22. I RHETORIC, chapter 9. See 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, 609.
23. CICERO, 23 DE LEGIBUS I at 8 (circa 50 B.C.).
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simply unable to make decisions. They are simply in the habit of letting
others decide.24
The problem is how to build good decision making at all levels of society.
IV. THE SOLUTION
The problem is solved by Professor Dorsey's book, American Free-
doms. The key to strengthening the democratic society is to improve the
decisions of the citizens so that they make wise and just decisions more
often than foolish, injury-causing ones.
Some will instantly say that this is already being done. But I say that it
is not. The three major areas of knowledge that are transmitted from one
generation to the next are the humanities, the social sciences and the
natural sciences. The transmission of this knowledge consists mainly in
students sitting passively in classrooms or lecture halls taking notes like
secretaries taking dictation. They read assigned texts. Then they study
their notes. Then at the end of the semester (perhaps more often in some
schools), they have to take exams to see if they have learned the material.
An exam is the teacher's way of certifying that the transmission of
knowledge has occurred accurately. Many teachers would say that the
exams would also teach them how to get knowledge-the phrase so often
used is "learning how to learn" or "learning how to think."
But how often are students (from 1st grade through graduate school)
required to make decisions-real decisions with real-life consequences?
How often are the students required to evaluate the knowledge they pre-
sumably get in school through the prism of decisions? Another way of
looking at this is by constantly asking the question of the knowledge you
acquire: how will this help me make better decisions or how will this
knowledge light my will in all the choices of life?25
Viewed this way, knowledge does not become an end in itself. In other
words, the question of knowledge should constantly be "how will this
24. THE ECONOMIST, June 20, 1987. In America an example of long-term usurpation of deci-
sion making to the detriment of the individual is in professional football. In 1987 Mr. Gene Upshaw,
the National Football League's player representative, appeared on national television and said, in
effect, that from high school through college and all the way through a professional football career,
players are told what to do. They make no decisions for themselves (except marriage). Then it all
comes to an end when, either by injury or old age, they are no longer useful to the team and they are
"let go". Suddenly they are on their own and they are simply unable to make decisions. They never
had to make decisions before. It was all done for them. In effect they have been robbed of their true
humanity.
25. See Comment to Rule 1 from DESCARTES, RULES.
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improve man's life?" An argument could be made that all branches of
knowledge could be studied from the point of view of decisions.
Let me give some useful examples. In the humanities students study
tragedy (both ancient and modem). And what we study there are, quite
simply, the harmful consequences of stupid decisions.26 The benefit to
the reader is that he/she is not likely to make that choice!
Consider economics. Trace the consequences of nation-states making
the decision to erect trade-protection barriers. Or trace the consequences
of various interpretations (as gleaned from decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court) of the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In history consider Barbara Tuchman's popular book The March of
Folly, which traces the consequences of extremely stupid decisions, for
instance how the British lost America.
In natural science, trace the new directions plotted out (to make a de-
cision is to set a direction in which to move) by the scientific community
with regard to the discoveries of natural selection (Darwin), analytic ge-
ometry (Descartes), gravity (Newton), electricity (Faraday), psychoanal-
ysis (Freud), penicillin (Curie), dynamite (Nobel), special relativity
(Einstein), et al.
In law trace the deleterious consequences of the Dred Scott27 decision
or Plessey v. Ferguson.28
It seems that every branch of knowledge has traced a given path since
its own inception. What causes the path to change direction? What
makes it stand still? What makes that knowledge zone suddenly leap
ahead when for years it was barren and stagnant? In each case, some
forceful person or group of persons made decisions. It is useful and ap-
propriate in cultivating effective decisions in the next generation to ana-
lyze the choices of history.
Hindsight makes it easier to say something was good or bad. The key
is to develop foresight in students by constantly teaching them to look at
and evaluate the consequences of an option. Teaching a body of knowl-
26. Injurious, damaging, painful, suffering; this is why we call them tragic choices. See also
1986-87 YALE LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN at 57 where a course on "Tragic Choices" is described.
Note that it is taught by the Dean of the Law School. Another example of a collective decision that
can be studied over a long period is the decision by the U.S. Government to proceed with the ex-
tremely expensive B-1 Bomber. This decision started with the Eisenhower administration in the
1950s and extended through the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Nick Kotz's book, The Wild
Blue Yonder, Politics, Money and the B-1 Bomber (Pantheon Press, 1988), discusses this in detail.
27. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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edge is one thing; but teaching students to make decisions based on that
knowledge is what is really necessary.
Furthermore, schools should encourage decision-making from the ear-
liest possible age so that with time it gets stronger and stronger, i.e. more
and more reasonable and just.
The sad fact is that most people prefer to be told what to do; most
people are submissive to authority even when the consequences are a bit
uncomfortable.
However, when the generation in being fosters independent decision-
making on a routine basis both on written tests2 9 and in service exams,30
then the ideal of equal decisional competence may actualize, flourish, and
spread.31
So, reader in the year 2074, I close with a simple statement. Know
that in the 20th century there were people who genuinely saw the impor-
tance ofjustice. Know that they offer you a useful idea in promoting that
end, namely, the ordering belief of equal decisional competence. Finally,
know that we believe that wise and just decisions are cultivated in the
populace by training all citizens from an early age to make decisions and
accept the consequences of them because this, by trial and error and wise
supervision, will build right reason and a just (i.e., injury free and
healthy) society.
29. For example, where students are required to speculate on the consequences of possible
decisions.
30. Exams should be conducted so that students are actually required to apply their "knowl-
edge" by making decisions in the real world or as close to it as possible (e.g., in student run busi-
nesses, in political games, in legal games, in war and peace games, in civilization games, etc.). Or
imagine top students of one section of a city going to a less fortunate section of that city to teach
spelling and vocabulary to the less advantaged.
31. Indeed, being a genuine decision maker could make the difference between being employed
or unemployed. Mr. Peter Drucker, a famous thinker on business management in the late 20th
century, foresees a drastic pruning of ranks of corporate middle management. He says that "whole
layers of management neither make decisions nor lead. Instead their main, if not their only, function
is to serve as 'relays' " between the directors and line managers of a company. These non-deciders
clog the organization and they will be pruned. See THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1988, at 59.
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